The collapse of the Mexican Peso at the end of 1994 has been widely characterised as`the ®rst ®nancial crisis of the twenty-®rst century.' The International Monetary Fund played a central role in resolving the matter, as it had in many cases beforeÐand as it was called upon to do again when several Asian countries found themselves in crisis in the second half of 1997. The suggestion that ®nancial crises from now on are different from earlier episodes and that they require a different institutional response calls for some historical perspective. This paper examines the evolution of the Fund's role in dealing with ®nancial crises since its conception in 1944 in order to shed light on the similarities and contrasts between past events and the latest affairs.
1 Although it does not attempt to judge how the Fund's role should evolve to deal with the coming century, its aim is to provide part of the background for such an evaluation.
The Tequila Crisis, 1994±5
What constitutes a ®nancial crisis? In February and April 1995, the IMF made two of the largest ®nancial commitments in its history: a $17.8 billion credit to Mexico (apparently the largest loan ever made by anyone up to that time) and $6.8 billion to Russia. The circumstances and motivation were very different. 2 The Russian credit was driven in a classic manner by a`balance of payments need' (in the language of the Fund's Articles of Agreement) that resulted from a legacy of misguided macroeconomic and structural policies. To restore economic growth while respecting the balance of payments constraint, the Russian government had to substantially reform its whole economic policy regime. Because that effort would take time to carry out and more time to succeed, a large amount of external ®nancing was required for the interim. The credit from the IMF, disbursement of which was conditional on Russia's continued adherence to its policy programme, was both a signi®cant component of the ®nancing and a catalytic signal to other creditors that a credible and supportable policy reform was under way. If the stand-by arrangement with Russia was different from the myriad of similar credits made to other countries, it was a matter of degree: of absolute size, of political importance, and of the enormity of the economic transition that the government was trying to undertake.
The Mexico credit, although also based on the country's balance of payments need, was a different matter in important respects. Macroeconomic policies and performance were weakening in 1994 but still were considerably improved over the dismal record of the 1970s and early 1980s. In many respects, the Mexican economy seemed to be as structurally sound as it ever had been. As the year progressed, however, a series of shocks ranging from the uprising in Chiapas to the murder of the leading presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, acted like a tropical storm on a beach, washing away the smooth surface and exposing policy weaknesses and inconsistencies. Weaknesses identi®ed in the subsequent literature included reliance on relatively low domestic interest rates to try to protect the highly vulnerable banking system, insistence on maintaining an exchange rate band that had become inconsistent with the rate of monetary expansion, and dependence on shortterm capital instruments (particularly the now-infamous tesobonos) to ®nance the external de®cit. 3 By December, market participants were convinced that the exchange rate was seriously overvalued, rumors of an impending devaluation were rampant, and the central bank was dangerously low on reserves. A seemingly small shift in the balance of newsÐreports of military advances by the Zapatista rebel forces in Chiapas on December 19Ðtriggered a sell-off in Mexican stocks and bonds and forced the government to devalue the peso. When the devaluation failed to stem the out¯ow (and for structural reasons even aggravated itÐsee Garber, 1996) , the government gave up after just two days and allowed the the one to Russia in 1995. In March 1996, the Fund extended a new credit commitment to Russia, totaling $10.1 billion. The record was surpassed in December 1997, with the approval of a $21 billion stand-by arrangement for Korea. (Amounts given here in U.S. dollars are converted from the of®cial SDR amounts at the exchange rates prevailing at the time of approval.) Actual disbursements may have been smaller than the initial commitment; Mexico drew out around $13 billion of the amount available on its 1995 arrangement. Technically, IMF credits are not loans; the country borrows by exchanging domestic currency for foreign exchange or SDRs, and then repays by reversing the exchange. The economic effects of the transaction are indistinguishable from those of a conventional loan.
3 For an inside view on Mexico's progress, see Aspe (1993) and Aspe's keynote address in Boughton and Lateef (1995) , pp. 126±38. For a slightly earlier outside perspective, see Loser and Kalter (1992) . On the slippages in 1994, see Folkerts-Landau and Ito (1995) , p. 54. Domestic interest rates were raised during 1994, and then much more sharply after the crisis. peso to¯oat. Before the crisis ®nally ended in March, the peso would lose more than half of its initial value against the U.S. dollar.
What brought Mexico to seek the assistance of the Fund was a formerly latent balance of payments problem that swiftly became manifest in response to a ®nancial crisis, which shall be de®ned here as a sudden and catastrophic loss of net international assets that makes continuation of the existing policy regime impossible. In a pure ®nancial crisisÐregardless of whether it originates as a direct attack on the currency, a run on bank assets, or a decline in access to international capitalÐ, the existing regime would again be viable if the status quo ante could somehow be restored. In any real-world case (including this one), the existing regime almost certainly has¯aws that would have to be ®xed eventually, but what makes a ®nancial crisis is that those¯aws would not have posed an imminent threat to macroeconomic viability without a major shift in the willingness of investors and creditors to hold the country's assets and liabilities. The underlying problem is economic, but a sudden shift in market assessments about the problem precipitates a ®nancial crisis. What characterises a twenty-®rst century crisis is simply the speed and magnitude of the resulting¯ows.
Mexico already had a sizeable current account de®cit in 1994, but it had little dif®culty ®nancing it until the crisis hit. Correlatively, the political disruptions did not cause the economic problems, but they did affect the government's ®nancing options. The extent to which ®nancial markets initially underreacted and then overreacted to bad economic and political news in this (or any other) case is a matter of interpretation, but the ®nancial reaction certainly had a major negative impact on an already dif®cult situation for economic policy. 4 A ®nancial crisis calls for a similar response from the Fund as any other balance of payments problem except that the response must be quicker and possibly much larger than in a more traditional case. A country facing a typical balance of payments problem might expect four to six months' work, and possibly a year or more if the problem is severe and the solution complex, between its initial request for a credit arrangement and ®nal approval by the Fund. Upon approval, a typical stand-by arrangement might provide up to the equivalent of the borrower's quota in disbursements per year (depending on the Fund's current credit limits and the country's circumstances), which usually will cover only a moderate fraction of the initial external ®nancing gap. The stand-by arrangement with Russia fell into the upper end of that category.
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Negotiations began in October 1994, and the 12-month arrangement that was 4 For an analysis of the interplay between Mexico's economic and ®nancial problems, see Calvo (1996) . A contrasting view is given in a survey article in The Economist (December 9, 1995), which argues that`for anyone with a sense of history, there was little new in the Mexican de Âba Ãcle' (p. 3) and that the crisis was an inevitable consequence of unsustainable economic policies. The view taken here is essentially consistent with that of Dornbusch et al. (1995, p. 255) , that`events change the economic outlook, and markets react F F F and hence change the situation with which policymakers must work. This is a far cry from saying that markets will cause a collapse when there is no problem.'
5 Access under stand-by arrangements in that period averaged around 40% of quota per year; 100% was the upper limit. approved six months later was equivalent to Russia's quota. At that pace and rate, the Fund would have been able to offer Mexico just $2.6 billion, several months after the crisis erupted. Instead, the Executive Board approved an arrangement that committed approximately 4 1 2 times as much money at an annual rate (i.e., nearly seven times as much in total, spread out over 18 months), less than four weeks after the initial request. Even larger and more rapid responses were required when the Asian crisis hit in 1997. Most dramatically, the stand-by arrangement for Korea, which amounted to nearly 20 times Korea's quota and was heavily front-loaded, was negotiated in less than two weeks around the end of November.
To provide the large sums that might be required to smother a ®nancial crisis, the Fund can invoke the`exceptional circumstances' clause in its policy on access to Fund credits. 6 Until the end of January 1995, the Fund intended to lend Mexico approximately $7.8 billion, which already would have required invoking the exceptional circumstances clause and would have been the Fund's all-time largest ®nancial commitment. After the U.S. Congress balked at accepting the Clinton Administration's request for $40 billion in loan guarantees for Mexico, late in the evening of January 30, the Fund raised its own ante by $10 billion the next morning.
7 That unprecedented decision re¯ected a judgment that otherwise the crisis would have intensi®ed quickly to the point that Mexico might not have been able to sustain the convertibility of the peso. Moreover, without decisive intervention, a`tequila' or hangover (or, to choose the more traditional metaphor, contagion) effect could have threatened other emerging markets around the world. The Fund's concern about`systemic risk' was stated succinctly by the Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, during a press conference the day after the Fund approved thè unprecedented package' of ®nancing for Mexico:
We F F F had the responsibility not only to provide ®nancial support for Mexico's program and thereby to give con®dence to Mexico, but also to respond to the systemic implications of the Mexican crisis and to give con®dence to the international ®nancial system. F F F [The] crisis of con®dence in Mexico could have raised doubts about the situation in other countries as wellÐdoubts not warranted by fundamentals.' Without question, circumstances were exceptional, and it appeared unlikely that the crisis could have been resolved without providing much more than the usual amount of ®nancing. Although the Fund was able to ®nance that operation with its own resources, it later took action to ensure that suf®cient resources will be available for responding to future ®nancial crises. In particular, the Fund arranged for a $47 billion line of credit (the`New Arrangements to Borrow') from 25 of®cial creditors, to be drawn upon if needed to deal with threats to the stability of the international monetary system. Shortly after the Korean crisis broke out in 1997, the Fund established a`Supplemental Reserve Facility' (SRF) to provide extra quick-disbursing resources to countries facing a crisis of con®dence in ®nancial markets.
The need for a rapid response to ®nancial crises raises fundamental issues for the Fund, because it has ®nite resources and cannot be a true lender of last resort. Since 1952 the institution has maintained, in effect, that it cannot ensure that it is`making its resources temporarily available to members' (to quote again from the Articles of Agreement) 8 unless it makes its lending conditional on the adoption of adequate macroeconomic policies. If a ®nan-cial crisis requires that resources be provided in less time than it normally takes to negotiate those conditions, how can the Fund obtain adequate safeguards for its resources? The new SRF imposes surcharges on top of the Fund's usual interest rates, but such charges are not intended to be a substitute for conditionality or risk analysis.
Following the Mexican crisis (though not exclusively as a result of it), several measures were taken to strengthen Fund surveillance, with the dual aim of uncovering problems (whether in macroeconomic policies, debt management, or oversight of the ®nancial system) before crises erupt and of increasing the ef®ciency with which stabilisation programmes can be negotiated. Measures taken so far have included the initiation of more frequent contacts and discussions when needed for continuity, the establishment of standards for the dissemination of economic data, an increased¯ow of information from the Fund to the general public, an intensi®cation of the discussion of potential problem cases within the Fund and between the Fund and its members, and the adoption of what became known as the`eleven commandments' on economic policy. 
Bretton Woods, 1944
If the crises of the 1990s have a`twenty-®rst century'¯avour, it is because they are ignited in part by the actions of a large number of individual investors and creditors (resident and nonresident) operating in a global capital market. By now, the long-simmering debate over the wisdom of capital controls has been overtaken by the realisation that under many circumstances in the modern 8`T emporarily' was added to this phrase from Article I in 1969, but the sense was implicit and understood from the beginning.
9 For a summary of the Fund's analysis of the implications of the Mexico crisis for the conduct of surveillance, see the IMF Annual Report for 1995, pp. 42±50. Measures taken subsequently are described in the 1996 Annual Report, pp. 42±3. The`commandments' document is`Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth,' Interim Committee Declaration (September 29, 1996) ; reprinted in IMF Survey, vol. 25 (October 14, 1996), p. 327. world such controls are no longer viable. No country can share in the bene®ts of international trade unless it allows capital to move freely enough to ®nance that trade, and modern ®nancial markets are sophisticated and open enough that capital transactions can no longer be compartmentalised as trade-related or speculative. At most,`emerging market' countries might hope to stem the in¯ationary and other adverse impacts of capital in¯ows through selective controls (Bhattacharya et al., 1997; Folkerts-Landau and Ito, 1995) .
The development of a vibrant global capital market has thus nulli®ed one of the guiding principles behind the Fund's Articles of Agreement as drafted at Bretton Woods in 1944. That charter created an institution designed to prevent a resurgence of the type of autarky to which so many countries resorted after World War I and which was thought to have contributed to the depths of the depression of the 1930s by sti¯ing international trade. International ®nance was another matter. The British vision of the IMF, as drafted by John Maynard Keynes, called for a system that would`make unnecessary those methods of restriction and discrimination which countries have adopted F F F as measures of self-protection from disruptive outside forces.' But Keynes also proposed that the Fund should be able to require a country to introduce`the control of outward capital transactions if not already in force', as a condition for borrowing. In other words, Keynes saw controls on current transactions as bad, and capital controls as possibly bene®cial.
The American plan, drafted by Harry Dexter White and his deputy, Edward M. Bernstein, took a similar view and elaborated the nuances and con¯icts more elaborately. A 1944 U.S. Treasury document noted that capital out¯ows were not necessarily undesirable, but that they should be reasonably related to the need to ®nance trade on the current account; that is, the current account should drive the capital account, not the other way around. The U.S. team clearly feared that autonomous or speculative capital out¯ows were a real possibility, and that such out¯ows would lead not to a current account surplus but to unsustainable reserve losses that countries would seek to staunch by borrowing from the Fund. The report concluded:`It is only when the capital exports are net, large, sustained, and motivated chie¯y by the desire for speculative pro®t that the Fund is likely to require a restriction of capital exports as a condition for continued use of the Fund's resources.' 10 Article VI of the Articles of Agreement re¯ects those views. To control the use of Fund credits and ensure that scarce resources will be available for the basic purpose of ®nancing current account de®cits, Article VI prohibits the Fund from ®nancing`large or sustained' capital out¯ows, encourages countries facing such out¯ows to impose controls to regulate them, and permits the Fund to deny credits to countries that fail`to exercise appropriate controls'. Although no country was ever declared ineligible on these grounds, Article VI was not substantively amended while the global capital market underwent its remark-able sea change, and it continued to govern the Fund's decisions on whether to extend credit to countries. Only in 1997 did the idea take hold of amending the Articles to give the Fund a mandate to promote the free¯ow of capital.
Suez, 1956
During the ®rst decade of the IMF's life as a ®nancial institution, what little lending the Fund did was aimed at helping countries establish currency convertibility for current account transactions at ®xed exchange rate parities. Then in 1956, for the ®rst time the Fund was called upon to help its members cope with a major international crisis: the closing of the Suez Canal. The Suez crisis, of course, was not primarily ®nancial. After the Egyptian government nationalised the canal in July, the British, French, and Israeli governments engaged in military actions against Egypt that began in October and lasted nearly two months but succeeded only in temporarily closing the canal altogether. In the midst of this turmoil and uncertainty, all four of the combatants turned to the Fund.
First in the queue was Egypt, which had never borrowed from the IMF since joining as an original member in December 1945. Egypt drew its gold tranche ($15 million) in September 1956, while it was keeping the canal open in the face of the sudden departure of all of the European boat pilots. In February 1957, while trying to get the canal cleared and ready to reopen, Egypt borrowed another $15 million (its ®rst credit tranche). By going no higher and not requesting a stand-by arrangement to borrow from the upper credit tranches, the government avoided explicit conditions on its economic policies and obtained immediate access to the money.
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Next came France, which obtained a one-year stand-by arrangement for its gold and ®rst credit tranches, totaling $262.5 million (the largest commitment undertaken by the Fund up to that time). The credit was requested informally in late September, while France was arming Israel in preparation for an invasion of the Sinai, and it was approved by the Executive Board on October 17.
12 Initially, the government intended to treat the arrangement as a true stand-by and draw on it only as necessary. From February to June 1957, however, the full amount was drawn.
The British government announced on December 3 that it was withdrawing its troops from Egypt and giving up its attempt to force Egypt to return control 11 The gold tranche was, in effect, the amount that member countries paid into the Fund in gold or U.S. dollars, normally equal to 25% of their quota. A`gold tranche purchase' was a drawing of foreign exchange from the Fund that did not raise the Fund's holdings of the member's currency above its quota. Under the rules then in effect, a withdrawal of the gold tranche was treated as a credit that had to be repaid. When the First Amendment became effective in 1969, members could automatically and permanently draw out the gold tranche if they chose. (The Second Amendment, enacted in 1978, renamed it the`reserve tranche'.) A drawing on the ®rst credit tranche was always treated as a credit but was not usually subject to explicit policy conditions. The remaining three credit tranches could be borrowed, usually under a stand-by arrangement, subject to acceptance by the Fund of a proposal by the government to adopt speci®ed policies capable of restoring external ®nancial viability. 12 France's economic dif®culties predated the Suez crisis and were related also to the war in Algeria. For a fuller discussion of this and other economic aspects of the Suez crisis, see Kunz (1991). of the canal to the internationally owned Suez Canal Company. A week later, it drew out its gold tranche and its ®rst credit tranche from the Fund ($561.5 million), and the Executive Board approved a one-year stand-by arrangement under which Britain could borrow another $738.5 million. Exceptionally, in deference to the United Kingdom's role in the institution and in the world economy and to the government's intention not to draw on the arrangement, no explicit policy conditions were attached to the upper-tranche stand-by. 13 Five months later, Israel, completing the circle not long after its pullback from the Gaza Strip, drew out its gold and ®rst credit tranches ($3.8 million). By then, the IMF was on the world's ®nancial map for the ®rst time in its brief history. In nearly ten years of operations before the Suez crisis, the Fund had lent an average of $135 million a year to its member countries. In the two years immediately preceding the crisis, only ®ve countries had borrowed from the Fund, for a total of $90 million. Of those, only one (Mexico) had a stand-by arrangement, and only one (the Philippines) drew in the upper tranches. The Fund was lolling in a backwater. Then in 1956±7, beginning with the Egyptian credit, total drawings jumped to nearly $1.7 billion. Of that, $989 million (59% of the total) was to the four principals in the Suez affair.
14 At its core, Suez was a political crisis. On the periphery, it was an economic hardship that placed pressure on the balance of payments of each participant. For the United Kingdom, it also had some of the ®nancial characteristics de®ned at the outset of this paper, though without the immediacy that came later to be the hallmark of a ®nancial crisis. Sterling came under heavy speculative pressure in the form of short-term capital out¯ows unrelated to the current account. In the absence of that speculation, British reserves would have been stable and adequate; even with the commercial effects of the closing of the canal, the United Kingdom had a current account surplus for both 1956 and 1957. For the other countries, however, the external imbalances arose mainly from the current, not the capital, account.
In responding to the requests for ®nancial assistance that arose out of the Suez crisis, the IMF merely applied its existing procedures, with some¯ex-ibility. The fact that the stand-by arrangement for the United Kingdom was aimed at protecting the country's reserves against speculative capital¯ows rather than a current-account de®cit did not prevent the Fund from approving it, nor even provoke much debate. 15 The ef®cacy of the process helped to 13 The stand-by was renewed twice and remained in effect until December 1959, but no drawings were ever made on it.
14 Curiously, Horse®eld (1969) made only a few passing references to the Suez in discussing the jump in Fund lending from 1956 on. See James (1995, pp. 102±5 and 137) for a fuller discussion. As James observed, total Fund lending was higher in relation to world trade during the years right after Suez than at any other time before or since.
15 Discussing the request, several Executive Directors regretted that it was not driven by the current account, but they also noted that unless the capital account was stabilised, the British authorities might be forced to impose exchange restrictions that would suppress trade. With that forward-looking perspective, the arrangement was consistent with the Fund's Articles. 
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demonstrate the value of the Fund as a lending institution and thus contributed to a sharp and sustained increase in the level of its activities. It was the ®rst case in which the Fund was drawn into a crisis, but it would greatly overstate the institution's role to call it a crisis manager.
Collapse of the Gold Pool, 1968
The capital account as an independent force became a more general issue in the early 1960s, after most industrial countries had reestablished convertibility for current account transactions. When countries with the most advanced ®nancial systems began dismantling capital controls, the Fund treated it as a welcome development and thus began to distance the institution further from the view that had prevailed at Bretton Woods. 16 The honeymoon was short. By the mid-1960s, autonomous capital¯ows were becoming a signi®cant irritant to the major industrial countries (Solomon, 1982, Chapter 3) . As early as July 1963, the United States imposed an`interest equalisation tax' to discourage short-term capital out¯ows, at a time when its current account balance was in surplus. The United Kingdom also tightened its capital controls around that time. By the late 1960s, many other industrial countries were doing so as well, and the incipient capital account revolution was in full retreat.
The second major international economic crisis of the postwar era was a direct product of those disruptive capital¯ows: the collapse of the Gold Pool in 1968. Through a system established in 1961, the central banks of eight major industrial countries acted together to stabilise the market price of gold in London at $35 an ounce.
17 In¯ationary fears and rising commercial demand put pressure on that price that mounted throughout 1966 and 1967, but the Gold Pool maintained stability in the face of massive capital out¯ows by drawing heavily on of®cial exchange reserves. When reserve losses became too large to sustain, the London gold market shut down temporarily in March 1968 and reopened only after the of®cial Gold Pool was disbanded. From that point on, the major central banks exchanged gold for reserves only among themselves (if at all), and the price of gold was left to ®nd its own value in the private markets.
The only Gold Pool member that turned to the IMF for help during the crisis was the United Kingdom. Most members had comfortable reserve cushions; U.S. reserves, which had declined sharply through the late 1950s and early 1960s, actually stabilised in 1967±8. France protected its reserves by withdrawing from the Pool in June 1967. British resources, however, were not 16 In a February 1961 discussion on whether it was appropriate for the Fund to ®nance`capital transfers', the Managing Director, Per Jacobsson, stated that`some of these movements are a normal feature of international business under conditions of widespread convertibility and freedom of transfers, which are most certainly welcomed by the Fund' (emphasis added). The Executive Board decided at that time that neither the Articles nor previous Board decisions precluded the Fund from ®nancing capital transfers, as long as the transfers were not`large or sustained'. See Horse®eld (1969) , vol. 2, pp. 415±6. 17 The original participating countries were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. strong enough to withstand the onslaught, and the government was forced to devalue sterling and seek a $1.4 billion credit from the IMF in November 1967. Less than two years later, France also devalued and obtained a supporting stand-by arrangement from the Fund.
Neither the British nor the later French stand-by resulted from the international gold crisis. Both derived from more general balance of payments problems. British reserves had been weakened by years of mismatched policiesÐ®scal and monetary expansions that were inconsistent with a ®xed parity for sterlingÐand by the burdens of preserving the sterling monetary area. The French franc was vulnerable because of the strength of the deutsche mark, because of the disruptions to both trade and ®nance from the domestic unrest of 1968, and ®nally because of the collapse of the government of Charles de Gaulle. 18 The international ®nancial crisis that threw $35 gold into the dustbin of history neither aggravated nor hastened the external economic imbalances in Europe.
What is most striking about the late 1960s, viewed from the perspective of the late 1990s, is that the role of the IMF was con®ned to the realm of economic policy and was linked only indirectly to events in ®nancial markets. At no point was the IMF involved in the effort to stabilise the gold market, but it did play a crucial role in convincing the British and French governments that they could no longer escape devaluation, in evaluating the size of the required parity changes, in helping to design the accompanying adjustments to macroeconomic policies, and in providing large credits until the new policy regimes could take hold.
Collapse of Bretton Woods, 1971±3
The independence between economic and ®nancial problems unravelled further in the 1970s, partly because of a dramatic growth in international private capital markets and partly because of questionable policy making. As a ®rst approximation, current account de®cits were no more than a short-term nuisance for the large industrial countries during the Bretton Woods era. As late as 1970, all of the Group of Seven (G-7) countries reported very small current account surpluses (less than $3 billion). What they had on occasion in the 1960s were capital account out¯ows that applied pressure to of®cial reserves. Although at the time those out¯ows were blamed on speculation iǹ hot money', sober re¯ection showed that they were caused primarily by overly expansionary macroeconomic policies. Their causes were economic, and their effects were both economic and ®nancial.
External economic balance was shattered in the 1970s. Current account imbalances became larger and more cyclical, and shifts in macroeconomic policies to limit those imbalances became more pronounced (Bayoumi, 1990) . Current de®cits, which were fed further by the 1973±4 oil shock, were ®nanced to a greater extent than before by short-term capital¯ows through the nascent Eurocurrency markets. The exchange market crisis of 1973, the one that ushered in the modern era of¯oating exchange rates, was fundamentally different from the gold market crisis of 1968: it resulted directly from trade and current account de®cits, and it quickly made those de®cits un®nanceable at the existing exchange rates. American tourists abroad were shocked to ®nd that the U.S. dollar was not welcome in shops, in restaurants, or in banks. The response, of course, also was fundamentally different: instead of de®cit countries devaluing, adjusting, and borrowing from the IMF, the major creditor countries simply stopped intervening to support the dollar's value.
What did not change was that the IMF still was not directly involved in managing or resolving the crisis. The Fund provided technical assistance and advice to the Group of Ten (G -10) during the months of work leading up to the group's Smithsonian meeting, when a new set of ®xed exchange rates was established. The Fund provided the institutional framework for the Committee of Twenty and its successor, the Interim Committee, to try to reform the international monetary system in 1972±6. The Fund held annual consultations with all of the major countries and provided systemic analysis through its World Economic Outlook exercise. But the decision to allow currencies tō oat against the U.S. dollar temporarily insulated the economies of the G-10 countries from the immediate consequences of the ®nancial crisis and obviated a direct ®nancing role for the Fund.
Partly because of the contemporaneous economic crisis that resulted from the 1973±4 rise in oil prices, and partly because of major differences in the way countries adjusted macroeconomic policies in the aftermath of the two shocks, both the United Kingdom and Italy developed balance of payments de®cits that required substantial ®nancial help from the IMF in 1976±7. The United Kingdom temporarily retained its status as the largest borrower from the Fund, and it became clear that¯oating exchange rates were not a substitute for sound policies. Nonetheless, the British and Italian credits arose from what now can be called old-fashioned twentieth-century crises: economic, but not yet truly ®nancial in the sense used in this paper.
Although the role of the IMF in dealing with crises was not yet evolving, the seeds for a transformation were germinating in the wake of the ®rst oil shock. As soon as the oil-exporting countries began to accumulate current account surpluses, both the IMF and the OECD, as well as of®cials in the major oil-importing countries, undertook to examine how those surpluses could best be`recycled'. For the ®rst time in history, the world faced a global problem of payments imbalances, one which could not be solved within the group of advanced economies or even between that group and the newly wealthy oil exporters. It was unrealistic to expect the oil exporters to ®nance the increased de®cits of the 100 or so oil-importing developing countries directly. The solution that emerged was a classic case of ®nancial intermediation: the oil exporters invested the bulk of their surpluses in the ®nancial systems of the industrial countries, and the banks onlent a substantial portion of those funds to the oil-importing developing countries. As a result, total international bank lending tripled in size from 1973 to 1978 (BIS Annual Report, various dates).
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The initial phase of recycling, from 1973 to 1978, caused few immediate problems, in large part because a cyclical boom in primary commodity prices raised the value of many developing countries' exports pari passu with their increased external debt service. Although the aggregate current account de®cit of the oil-importing developing countries widened slightly in relation to total exports (from 13% to 15%), the ratio of external debt to exports fell (112% to 102%). Nonetheless, owing to a combination of rising interest rates and shortening maturities, the debt service ratio rose from 14 1 4 % to 16 3 4 % (Boughton, 1984) .
In 1979±80, the combination of the`Volcker shock' (which ended the calamitous in¯ation of the 1970s but also sharply raised world interest rates and depressed the markets for developing-country exports) and the second oil shock (which further worsened the terms of trade for oil-importing countries) drastically altered the playing ®eld, and the latent imbalances in the global distribution of wealth ®nally became manifest. By 1981, the aggregate current account de®cit of oil-importing developing countries had reached 25% of exports, and the debt service ratio had risen to nearly 19%. Capital was still owing freely into developing countries, but at steadily increasing prices and at a steadily rising burden to the borrowers.
The International Debt Crisis, 1982±9
The major turning point both for the international ®nancial system and for the crisis-management role of the IMF came in 1982. The fact that the world did not witness an international ®nancial crisis in 1995 is attributable in no small measure to the lessons learned then. The debt crisis of the 1980sÐthe`lost decade' for economic growth in much of the developing worldÐerupted when the major international banks ceased lending and attempted to stop rolling over existing credits to a large number of economically troubled developing countries. It built up steam slowly as it rolled across Eastern Europe in 1981 and the ®rst half of 1982, but it globalised rapidly after it landed in Latin America that summer. 20 It was neither the ®rst nor the last international debt crisis, but it was a major turning point in the history of the world economy because it marked the coming of age of the international ®nancial system.
Many people saw that problems were coming in 1982, but virtually no one foresaw a crisis. All of the developing countries that were hit by the debt crisis in the early 1980s were following inconsistent and unsustainable policies, characterised by heavy external borrowing to support domestic consumption spending. Many also had serious de®ciencies in public administration and regulation. The Fund staff recognised those de®ciencies, as did most outside analysts. By mid-1982, banks were charging higher spreads to those countries, and they were experiencing greater dif®culties in assembling lending syndicates. Nonetheless, syndicated bank lending to Mexico, for example, continued until end-July, just two weeks before the crisis hit.
The debt crisis of 1982 was a true (though not a pure) ®nancial crisis, in that it occurred because the banks suddenly stopped lending. The timing and even the fact of such an event is inherently impossible to forecast, because it is not an inevitable consequence of bad economic policies. Many observers at the time, including those in the Fund, believed that Mexico could hang on until December, when a new government under President Miguel de la Madrid would take of®ce. Taking on new debt to pay interest on old debt is a Ponzi scheme only in the absence of a viable exit strategy from the process, and the July elections seemed to provide that rationale. Ex ante, depending on lenders' assessment of risks, degree of risk aversion, and ®nancial strength, waiting for December might or might not have been optimal. In mid-August, however, new money dried up, and Mexico faced a crisis that could be resolved only through international coordination.
Mexico could not solve its problem unilaterally, except possibly through a major devaluation or a default. The government ruled out both of those options as being far too risky. Mexico's major trading partner, the United States, was not prepared to bail out the Mexican government and was willing to provide new ®nancing only at a high cost and only after Mexico entered into negotiations for a Fund-supported programme. The IMFÐthe only institution with both the mandate and the resources to react quicklyÐstepped into the breach. On Friday, August 13, 1982, the key Mexican ®nance of®cials arrived in Washington to meet with their U.S. counterparts and with senior of®cials in the Fund. The meetings held throughout that weekend led immediately to an emergency ®nancing package from the United States, and they set in motion a process that would lead to a bridge loan from the BIS a 20 Because of the rapid international spreading of the 1982 crisis, countries other than Mexico appeared to be the victims of a contagious disease. At the time, it was fashionable to claim that the countries that were affected soon after MexicoÐnotably Argentina and BrazilÐ would have been able to continue to borrow and conduct business as usual, but for the Mexican crisis. It was not then called a tequila effect, but that is what was meant. The Fund staff and management never accepted that argument, and in retrospect it is clear that it had little merit. All of the affected countries have since undergone wrenching and often remarkable policy reformations, in a unanimous rejection of the policy regimes that were so staunchly defended in the early 1980s. Contagion accelerated the process, but it did not cause the crisis. few weeks later, an agreement with commercial banks in November, and an extended arrangement from the Fund in December.
The IMF played two essential roles in that process. 21 First, the agreement between the Managing Director ( Jacques de Larosie Áre) and the Mexican ®nance minister ( Jesu Â s Silva Herzog) to negotiate an adjustment programme to be supported by a large-scale Fund arrangement restored the possibility of an exit strategy and enabled of®cial creditors to justify new loans. A Fund staff mission left for Mexico City as soon as the weekend was over and completed a tentative agreement in just two weeks. That agreement was soon scuttled by the outgoing President, Jose Â Lo Âpez-Portillo, but it was gradually patched back together over the next two months and was ready to be implemented by the time the new government took of®ce on December 1.
Second, de Larosie Áre devised a novel solution to the problem posed by the large number of international bank creditors with strikingly diverse interests. The Fund's normal operating procedure in providing ®nancing for a country's balance of payments de®cit was to estimate the total amount of ®nancing required, determine the appropriate amount to come from the Fund on the basis of the institution's rules and practices, and approve the arrangement if the balance appeared likely to be forthcoming from other creditors. In the 1982 crisis, that procedure failed, because private creditors were unwilling to ®ll the gap. The key insight was that although each creditor bank had an interest in reducing its exposure, the banks had a collective interest in maintaining Mexico's ability to service its debts, even if that meant increasing their exposure. If a collective solution could be imposed, the banks would be better off.
The Managing Director went before the banks, at a meeting in New York in mid-November, and informed them that he would recommend to the IMF's Executive Board that the Fund lend Mexico around $3.8 billion over three years, only if he received written assurances from the banks within six weeks that they would increase their own exposure to Mexico by $5 billion.
22 That gambit, which initiated the practice of what came to be known as`concerted lending' (or, misleadingly, as`new money' packages), succeeded in ®lling the ®nancing gap and became the hallmark of the`case by case' debt strategy for the next four years. Because concerted lending required an outside and international agent with considerable ®nancial involvement in the outcome, the Fund in effect became the manager of the crisis.
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The rationale for the IMF taking on the role of crisis manager in 1982 had four elements: (a) that several of the most heavily indebted developing 21 This brief synopsis of the Fund's role in the 1982 crisis and in the development of the debt strategy throughout the rest of the 1980s necessarily omits much detail and nuance; my forthcoming history of the IMF for the years 1979±89 covers these developments in full.
22 By that time, the Fund and the banks were engaged in similar negotiations with Argentina. The New York meeting dealt with both countries. 23 The requirement that the external agent have a considerable ®nancial involvement was necessary to make the threat credible. The banks understood that approval by the Fund of a large extended arrangement would not make sense if the money provided to Mexico would have to be used to repay the banks.
countries would have had to default if they had not obtained additional loans on a large scale; (b) that default posed a serious threat both to the economic health of the borrowers and to the international ®nancial system; (c) that taking on new debts was a sound economic strategy if done on appropriate terms and in conjunction with reforms in macroeconomic policies; and (d) that neither the ®nancing nor the reforms could be obtained without multilateral intervention. The ®rst elementÐthe inevitability of defaultÐwas simply a matter of arithmetic, at least in the short run. 24 The second elementÐthe cost of defaultÐwas more controversial, but what must be remembered is that the 1982 debt crisis was fundamentally different from all others. The debts were almost entirely in the form of large syndicated bank loans, rather than bonds (as in the 1930s and earlier) or bonds and equities (as in the 1990s) held by large numbers of individual investors. Syndication, in combination with low capitalisation by many of the leading banks, contributed to a fragile and interdependent system that could much more easily be brought down through a rippling or cascading of defaults.
The third elementÐthe wisdom of taking on new debtÐwas based on an implicit calculation that countries could service their debts, given enough time to strengthen their economies and their ®scal systems. Only later was the need for deeper structural reforms fully appreciated. The ®nal elementÐthe need for an outside agentÐwas based partly on the lack of cohesion among creditors and partly on the direct and obvious observation that agreements could not be achieved by any other means.
Both the debt strategy and the role of the IMF evolved between the onset of the crisis and its resolution in 1989. Concerted lending, as practised in the 1980s, had several weaknesses. First, adjustment programmes were not supported by the structural reforms that were needed to put the countries on a sustainable growth path. It was not until the mid-1980s that the Fund and the indebted countries together moved to a more broadly based strategy of structural reform. Second, the`new money' provided under concerted lending arrangements was invariably less than the countries' interest obligations; the banks' exposure rose, but each country was still required to make net cash payments to the banks. This eventually opened the Fund to criticism that it was little more than a collection agency for the banks (Lissakers, 1991) . Third, concerted lending effectively precluded normal capital in¯ows as long as it was in effect. Throughout the 1980s, no bank had any incentive to lend to a highly indebted country other than through a concerted arrangement. Fourth, concerted lending was inherently a temporary patch, not a lasting solution. After the second or third agreement with a country, and particularly after the 24 Sovereign`default' usually means a unilateral standstill on payments as a means of forcing a renegotiation of terms, rather than a permanent refusal or inability to repay. That such a default was inevitable does not imply that the indebted countries in Latin America were insolvent. Mexico had tradable assets (oil reserves) that were enormous in relation to the government's external debt, but it had only a very limited political ability to mobilise those assets for servicing external debts or to generate suf®cient additional ®scal revenues. As I have argued elsewhere (Boughton, 1994) , the distinction between illiquidity and insolvency is a red herring in this context. banks had enough time to restore some strength to their own capital, the dif®culty of rounding up hundreds of participants escalated geometrically. Thus by around 1987, the strategy that had worked well at the beginning was rapidly losing its viability.
Although the IMF continued to play a central role in managing the debt strategy throughout the 1980s, the major re®nements in the strategy were initiated by others. In 1984, de Larosie Áre gave form and substance to a proposal from a few commercial bankers and from U.S. Federal Reserve of®cials for`multi-year rescheduling agreements' (MYRAs) aimed at freeing indebted countries from having to constantly renegotiate terms on their outstanding obligations. Beginning with an agreement with Mexico, commercial banks (and, later, of®cial creditors) entered into MYRAs with several developing countries that showed prospects of graduating from dependence on ®nancial support from the Fund. Those agreements were made possible by a decision by the Fund to undertake`enhanced surveillance' to monitor the progress of`shadow programmes' implemented without direct Fund support.
The Fund's longer-term ®nancial involvement in the debt strategy was limited by the revolving character of IMF resources. Although many countries required several years of back-to-back annual or longer adjustment programmes, the Fund's exposure usually peaked after the ®rst few years. At the point when countries were trying to move beyond adjustment to restore economic growth, the Fund was seldom able to do much more than maintain its exposure. To compensate for that gap in the strategy, and to revive the commercial banks'¯agging willingness to participate in concerted lending, the U.S. Treasury introduced the Baker Plan in October 1985. The Fund responded to the initiative with a major effort to develop`growth-oriented' adjustment programmes, primarily by encouraging borrowers to undertake market-oriented structural reforms alongside macroeconomic stabilisation. Perhaps not surprisingly, neither that effort nor a parallel endeavour in the World Bank succeeded in restoring growth in the heavily indebted countries within the limited time frame of the Baker Plan (1986±8). Structural reforms take time to succeed, commercial bank creditors provided little of the hopedfor increase in loans, and the covered countries had to overcome the nearly insurmountable burden of their`debt overhang'. Several proposals were advanced by of®cials of creditor countries in 1987 and 1988 for providing direct debt relief, 25 most notably the Miyazawa Plan that was ®rst¯oated at the G -7 summit in Toronto in the summer of 1988. During that time, the IMF experimented with a`menu' of departures from the concerted lending approach but avoided taking a direct institutional stand in favour of debt relief. Finally, the announcement of the Brady Plan in March 1989 provided the political support for multilateral action to reduce debt overhang. The key elements were to link debt relief to IMF and World Bank medium-term conditional lending arrangements and to create a menu of debtrelief options that was broad enough to be attractive to banks from North America, Western Europe, Japan, and the Middle East. For its part, the IMF modi®ed its procedures to permit lending more generally to countries that had unresolved arrears to commercial creditors and to dedicate some Fund resources to ®nance debt relief operations.
Over the next six years, more than $75 billion of the present value of debt was written off, at a cost of some $25 billion, mostly through Brady deals that were supported in part by the Fund and other multilateral ®nancial institutions. With serendipitous support from a coincidental massive decline in world interest rates, the Brady Plan ®nally made debt service manageable, restored voluntary lending by commercial banks, and brought the debt crisis to an end.
The 1990s and Beyond
When the Mexican and Asian ®nancial crises erupted in the 1990s, most elements of the role that the IMF was to play were already in place. Affected countries quickly turned to the Fund when they were unable to resolve their dif®culties either internally or with bilateral assistance. The Fund applied its existing`exceptional circumstances' clause so as to provide unusually large credits. Macroeconomic adjustment programmes were negotiated between the government and the staff as part of the arrangement: more quickly than usual, building on the rapid initial response to the Mexican debt crisis of 1982.
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Both the stand-by arrangements and the adjustment programmes that they supported were based on the view that the member country faced a`balance of payments need' that justi®ed Fund support. Ground was broken, however, in at least two respects that re¯ect the`twenty-®rst century' nature of the crisis. First, the speed of response was unprecedented for credits in the upper credit tranches, re¯ecting the perception that the risk of rapid contagion was much greater than in 1982.
27 Second, the size of the credits was far greaterÐin both absolute and relative termsÐthan the Fund had even considered in the past, re¯ecting the heightened vulnerability of emerging capital markets to potential out¯ows.
That the IMF has become, on occasion, a manager of ®nancial crises calls for an analysis of why such a role may be appropriate. Part of the debate concerns technical and factual questions that are outside the scope of this paper: How real is the risk of contagion in speci®c cases, how well designed are speci®c adjustment programmes, and is the Fund's commitment of resources in each case ®nancially prudent? The other part of the debate involves a question of broader principle: What is the rationale for an organised rather than a pure market response to a ®nancial crisis? A full answer to that question 26 In 1982, preliminary discussions on the terms of a possible stand-by had already begun before the crisis hit. In that regard, the rapidity of the recent negotiations is more remarkable. 27 The 1956 upper-tranche stand-by arrangement for the United Kingdom was approved within a few days of receipt of the request, butÐas noted aboveÐthat case was expedited by the understanding that the authorities intended not to draw on the arrangement. would also require another paper, but the historical review given above suggests at least a framework for it.
First, ®nancial crises result in part from a speci®c market failure: ®nancial markets at least occasionallyÐand sometimes spectacularlyÐinitially misjudge and eventually aggravate bad news. In the twentieth century, when economic activity was affected gradually by ®nancial disruptions, allowing ®nancial markets time to correct their own course was often feasible. In the twenty-®rst century, that luxury will no longer be affordable. Second, safeguarding the real economy requires conditionality. The bad news that ®nancial markets might misjudge results either from policy errors or from exogenous shocks that require policy adjustments. To shift policies requires credibility, and credibility often cannot quickly be restored unilaterally. Accepting external conditionality bene®ts the country if it strengthens credibility. Third, conditionality also reduces moral hazard to the indebted country (though not to creditors): ®nancial assistance, instead of bailing out a government, forces it to accept the short-term costs of shifting to a more sustainable course. Fourth, as Miller and Zhang (1997) argue, reliance on a market solution requires a`bankruptcy' procedure to avoid prisoners' dilemmas and creditors' races for the exits. Crisis management provides a viable alternative to a potentially much more costly international bankruptcy procedure. If the institution succeeds in resolving crises (or, a fortiori, in avoiding them through effective surveillance), it provides a public good.
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